23/08/2024

Smt. Nisha Devi Vs. Shri Gur Kirpal Singh @ Guddu. - There is no bar that unless the matter is forwarded to mediation for settlement, the same cannot be entered before the Court itself. The Court only needs to be satisfied that the settlement is lawful and consent of the parties is voluntary and not obtained under coercion or undue influence.

 HC Delhi  (2024.08.02) in Smt. Nisha Devi Vs. Shri Gur Kirpal Singh @ Guddu. [(2024) ibclaw.in 742 HC, CRL.M.C.792/2021, CRL.M.A.21694/2023 ] held that; 

  • In having so proceeded, there is a satisfaction of the voluntariness and legality of the terms of the settlement of the court and acceptance of the terms thereof as well as a specific order in terms thereof. Consequently, the amount payable under the settlement, would become an amount payable under an order of the criminal court.

  • So far as the disputes beyond the subject matter of the litigation is concerned, upon the settlement receiving ‘imprimatur’ of the court, such settlement would remain binding upon the parties and if so ordered, would be subject to the orders of the court.”

  • in case, the matter is referred to mediation. Thereupon, it becomes imperative for the Court to be satisfied that not only the agreement is lawful but the same is with the consent of the parties and was voluntary without any force, pressure or undue coercion.

  • Under Section 26 of the Mediation Act, 2023, the ‘mediation settlement agreement’ resulting from mediation signed by the parties and authenticated by the Mediator is final and binding between the parties and is enforceable under the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 by virtue of Section 27 of the Mediation Act, 2023, in the same manner as if it were a ‘judgment or a decree’ passed by the Court.

  • However, the ‘outcome of mediation’ in respect of compoundable offences forwarded for mediation shall not be deemed to be a judgment or a decree and shall be further considered by the Court in accordance with law for the time being in force, under second proviso to Section 6 of the Mediation Act, 2023.

  • As such, even though offence under Section 138 N.I. Act is quasi criminal in nature, the ‘outcome of settlement’ in mediation is required to receive imprimatur or authoritative approval of the Court, in case the proceedings are settled in mediation.

  • Having satisfied itself as to the voluntariness and legality of the settlement and recording the necessary statement/undertaking, the settlement becomes binding on the parties and cannot be retracted or resiled until and unless sufficient reasons are shown to reasonably infer that the settlement was under threat, pressure or coercion.

  • There is no bar that unless the matter is forwarded to mediation for settlement, the same cannot be entered before the Court itself. The Court only needs to be satisfied that the settlement is lawful and consent of the parties is voluntary and not obtained under coercion or undue influence.

  • If the settlement recorded before the Court is not held to be binding, the same would result in a mockery of process of law, whereby, the accused would be permitted to blow hot and cold and take entire system for a ride at his own discretion.


Excerpts of the Order;

# 1. Petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘Cr.P.C.’) read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been preferred on behalf of the petitioner challenging order dated 19.12.2020 passed by learned MM-06, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi, in Complaint Case No. 49784/2016 titled as Nisha Devi vs. Guru Kirpal Singh @ Guddu, in proceedings under Section 138 NI Act, whereby, an application preferred on behalf of the petitioner/complainant under Section 421 read with Section 431 Cr.P.C. seeking issuance of warrant of attachment and initiating contempt proceedings against the respondent/accused for willful default and breach of settlement order and undertaking was dismissed.


# 2. In brief, as per the case of petitioner, in proceedings under Section 138 NI Act, respondent (who was summoned as an accused) expressed his intention to compromise the matter and offered to settle the disputes by making payment of Rs. 1.20 crore against original liability of Rs. 1.10 crore. The same was agreed by the petitioner/complainant and a statement/undertaking of the respondent was recorded vide order dated 09.11.2020 by learned MM. A DD of Rs. 5 lacs dated 06.11.2020, prepared by the respondent in the name of petitioner along with 05 post-dated cheques of different dates were also handed over by the respondent on 09.11.2020. Respondent was accordingly released on interim bail and the matter was further fixed for 17.12.2020.


# 3. After more than a month of settlement and part discharge of the liability towards the settlement, the respondent backed out from his statement made before the learned Trial Court as recorded vide order 17.12.2020. An application under Section 421 read with Section 431 Cr.P.C. for issuance of warrant of attachment was further dismissed by the learned Trial Court vide impugned order dated 19.12.2020.


# 4. Mr. Puneet Mittal, learned Senior Advocate for petitioner submits that impugned order passed by the learned Trial Court, refusing to issue warrant of attachment and treating the settlement ‘non est’ merely on the ground that the matter was not referred to mediation and formal order accepting the settlement was not passed, is erroneous, since the Court is not barred from recording the settlement between the parties. He points out that only in case, the matter is referred to mediation, a formal order of acceptance of settlement is required to be passed by the learned Trial Court as held in Dayawati vs Yogesh Kumar Gosain, Crl. Reference No. 1/2016 decided on 17.10.2017.


He further emphasizes that statement of respondent was duly recorded by the Court itself after ensuring that the same is voluntary and settlement was recorded. As such, the observations made by the learned Trial Court that there is no valid settlement within the spirit of Dayawati vs Yogesh Kumar Gosain (supra) is erroneous. He urges that recording of settlement by the Court is not barred in law and the reasoning extended by the learned Trial Court relying upon Dayawati vs Yogesh Kumar Gosain (supra) that procedure of mediation is to be followed is misplaced.


# 5. On the other hand, Mr. K. K. Manan, learned Senior Advocate for the respondent vehemently opposes the petition and submits that settlement entered by respondent/accused was not voluntary but under immense pressure meted out by the petitioner of getting him arrested. The impugned order dated 19.12.2020 passed by learned MM is further supported by him on the ground that neither the matter was referred to mediation, nor statement of parties was recorded pursuant to any mediation settlement and further no formal order/acceptance of such settlement, after assessing its voluntariness and explaining the consequences of breach had been passed by the learned MM at the time of settlement.


Reliance is further placed upon Dayawati vs Yogesh Kumar Gosain (supra), Rajkumar Kuchhal vs. Loyal Logistics Pvt. Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 9649 and Vikas Aggarwal vs. Tripurari Mani Tripathi, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 9745.


# 6. In order to appreciate the contentions raised on behalf of respective counsels, settlement recorded by the learned Trial Court vide order dated 09.11.2020 along with the statement of the respondent may be reproduced for reference:

# 7. In Dayawati vs Yogesh Kumar Gosain (supra), the issue regarding legal permissibility of referring a complaint case under Section 138 NI Act for amicable settlement through mediation, procedure to be followed upon settlement and the legal implications of breach of mediation settlement were considered. Observations in paras 104 to 107 may be beneficially reproduced:

  • “104. Binding the parties to a settlement agreement entered into through a formal mediation process and being held accountable for honouring the same is really enforcing the legislative mandate in enacting Sections 138 and 147 of the NI Act i.e. to ensure an expeditious time bound remedy for recovery of the cheque amounts. Breach of a lawful entered agreement would not only frustrate the parties to the mediation, but would be opposed to the spirit, intendment and purpose of Section 138 of the NI Act and would defeat the ends of justice. The courts cannot permit use of mediation as a tool to abuse judicial process.

  • 105. There is no legal prohibition upon a criminal court seized of such complaint, to whom a mediated settlement is reported, from adopting the above procedure. Application of the above enunciation of law to a mediation arising out of a criminal case manifests that a settlement agreement would require to be in writing and signed by the parties or their counsels. The same has to be placed before the court which has to be satisfied that the agreement was lawful and consent of the parties was voluntary and not obtained because of any force, pressure or undue influence. Therefore, the court would record the statement of the parties or their authorized agents on oath affirming the settlement, its voluntariness and their undertaking to abide by it in the manner followed by the civil court when considering a settlement placed before it under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC. The court would thereafter pass an appropriate order accepting the agreement, incorporating the terms of the settlement regarding payment under Section 147 of the NI Act and the undertakings of the parties. The court taking on record the settlement stands empowered to make the consequential and further direction to the respondent to pay the money in terms of the mediated settlement and also direct that the parties would remain bound by the terms thereof.

  • 106. In having so proceeded, there is a satisfaction of the voluntariness and legality of the terms of the settlement of the court and acceptance of the terms thereof as well as a specific order in terms thereof. Consequently, the amount payable under the settlement, would become an amount payable under an order of the criminal court.

  • 107. So far as the disputes beyond the subject matter of the litigation is concerned, upon the settlement receiving ‘imprimatur’ of the court, such settlement would remain binding upon the parties and if so ordered, would be subject to the orders of the court.” 


# 8. On the face of record, the observations in Dayawati vs Yogesh Kumar Gosain (supra) which are germane for consideration relate to a mediated settlement and procedure to be followed in this regard, in case, the matter is referred to mediation. Thereupon, it becomes imperative for the Court to be satisfied that not only the agreement is lawful but the same is with the consent of the parties and was voluntary without any force, pressure or undue coercion. As such, it was observed in Dayawati vs Yogesh Kumar Gosain (supra) that the Court would record the statement of the parties or their authorized agents on oath affirming the settlement, its voluntariness and undertaking to abide by it, followed by an appropriate order accepting the agreement. Further, the Court taking on record the settlement stands empowered to make consequential directions, if required.


# 9. The position in regard to ‘mediation settlement agreement’ in cases permissible to be forwarded under the Mediation Act, 2023 and ‘outcome of mediation’ in reference to ‘criminal cases’ may also be beneficially noticed.


Under Section 26 of the Mediation Act, 2023, the ‘mediation settlement agreement’ resulting from mediation signed by the parties and authenticated by the Mediator is final and binding between the parties and is enforceable under the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 by virtue of Section 27 of the Mediation Act, 2023, in the same manner as if it were a ‘judgment or a decree’ passed by the Court. However, the ‘outcome of mediation’ in respect of compoundable offences forwarded for mediation shall not be deemed to be a judgment or a decree and shall be further considered by the Court in accordance with law for the time being in force, under second proviso to Section 6 of the Mediation Act, 2023. The reason for not deeming the outcome of such mediation in criminal case as a decree or judgment, is that criminal offences are generally considered as offences against the society and State, in respect of which the matter requires a larger consideration by the Court. As such, even though offence under Section 138 N.I. Act is quasi criminal in nature, the ‘outcome of settlement’ in mediation is required to receive imprimatur or authoritative approval of the Court, in case the proceedings are settled in mediation.


# 10. However, it is important to underscore that wheresoever, compromise/ settlement/compounding itself is recorded by the Court, it is inherent that Court is satisfied that the settlement is lawful and has been voluntarily entered between the parties. Having satisfied itself as to the voluntariness and legality of the settlement and recording the necessary statement/undertaking, the settlement becomes binding on the parties and cannot be retracted or resiled until and unless sufficient reasons are shown to reasonably infer that the settlement was under threat, pressure or coercion.


# 11. There is no bar that unless the matter is forwarded to mediation for settlement, the same cannot be entered before the Court itself. The Court only needs to be satisfied that the settlement is lawful and consent of the parties is voluntary and not obtained under coercion or undue influence.


Even when the Court permits the compounding of an offence, which is permissible under NI Act, there is no bar that the Court cannot compound the offence without forwarding the matter to mediation. When the matter is not forwarded to mediation but the Court records the settlement or compounds the offence, it is obvious that the proposal receives ‘imprimatur’ or authoritative approval of Court.


Learned Trial Court failed to consider the true import of the scope of observations in Dayawati vs Yogesh Kumar Gosain (supra).


# 12. A bare perusal of order dated 09.11.2020 reflects that the settlement was proposed on behalf of the respondent/accused in presence of his counsel for a total sum of Rs. 1.20 crore out of which Rs. 5 lacs was paid vide DD dated 06.11.2020 to the petitioner/complainant. The terms of the settlement were accepted on behalf of the petitioner/complainant on undertaking by the respondent. The statement of the respondent was also separately recorded and the remaining post-dated cheques were also handed over to the petitioner. In his statement, the respondent stated that the same was made without any force, pressure or coercion and executed the settlement for Rs. 1.20 crore.


In the facts and circumstances, there does not appear to be any reason to presume that the settlement was ‘not voluntary’ or under any force, pressure or coercion. The fact that the respondent had come with a DD dated 06.11.2020, which was handed over to the petitioner/complainant on 09.11.2020 reflects that he had already made up his mind to settle the issues. Once the said settlement was accepted by the petitioner and also received ‘imprimatur’ of the Court, there does not appear to be any reason for the Court to arrive at a contrary conclusion vide impugned order dated 19.12.2020 that there was no effective settlement bringing criminal proceedings to an end. The settlement was legal and voluntary without any force, pressure or coercion. The proceedings after settlement between the parties vide order dated 09.11.2020 were only for the purpose of ensuring the compliance of settlement by the parties.


# 13. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion that once a valid settlement stood recorded, the consequences of the same are bound to ensue and as such, on default or non-compliance or breach of settlement, learned MM is bound to pass an order under Section 421 read with Section 431 Cr.P.C. to recover the amount agreed to be paid by the respondent/accused in the same manner, as a fine would be recovered as held in Dayawati vs Yogesh Kumar Gosain (supra). If the settlement recorded before the Court is not held to be binding, the same would result in a mockery of process of law, whereby, the accused would be permitted to blow hot and cold and take entire system for a ride at his own discretion.


# 14. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent, Rajkumar Kuchhal vs. Loyal Logistics Pvt. Ltd. and Vikas Aggarwal vs. Tripurari Mani Tripathi, (supra) are distinguishable on facts.


In Rajkumar Kuchhal vs. Loyal Logistics Pvt. Ltd. (supra), midway of proceedings, the parties entered into settlement agreement in Mediation Cell. It was noticed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court that no formal settlement of the parties was recorded, nor any enquiry held as to the voluntariness of the settlement. As such, it was held that there was nothing shown, by which it could be inferred that settlement had the ‘imprimatur’ of the Court.


Similarly, in Vikas Aggarwal vs. Tripurari Mani Tripathi, (supra), it was noticed in para 8 that no formal proceedings were drawn by learned Magistrate with reference to the settlement through mediation, no enquiry was made by learned MM as to the voluntariness of the settlement, nor any effective order was passed adopting the said settlement.


However, in the present case, the settlement has been duly recorded by the learned MM himself and also the statement of the respondent/accused was recorded in presence of his counsel. The parties further acted in furtherance of same as DD for Rs.5 lacs was handed over by respondent/accused to petitioner/complainant.


# 15. For the foregoing reasons, impugned order dated 19.12.2020 passed by learned MM is set aside. The settlement between the parties in terms of order dated 09.11.2020 is binding. Accordingly, application under Section 421 read with Section 431 Cr.P.C. shall be considered by the learned Trial Court in accordance with law.


Petition is accordingly disposed of. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

A copy of this order be forwarded to the learned Trial Court for information and compliance.

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02/08/2024

Vasan Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. Vs. India Infoline Finance Ltd. - At the same time, it is to be bear in mind the protection under Section 32-A of Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is restricted only to the Corporate debtor and not to its Directors who were in-charge of the affairs of the Company when the offence committed or the signatory of the cheque.

 HC Madras (2024.07.24) in Vasan Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. Vs. India Infoline Finance Ltd. [(2024) ibclaw.in 700 HC, Crl.O.P.Nos.1772, 1775, 1776, 1784, 1786, 1788, 1792, 1796 & 1797 of 2024 & Crl.M.P.Nos.1224, 1226, 1227, 1235, 1237, 1238, 1251, 1255 & 1259 of 2024] held that; 

  • Assuming, therefore, that there is a clash between Section 14 IBC and the first proviso of Section 32-A(1), this clash is best resolved by applying the doctrine of harmonious construction so that the objects of both the provisions get subserved in the process, without damaging or limiting one provision at the expense of the other.

  • At the same time, it is to be bear in mind the protection under Section 32-A of Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is restricted only to the Corporate debtor and not to its Directors who were in-charge of the affairs of the Company when the offence committed or the signatory of the cheque.


Excerpts of the order;

The petitioner company is accused in the complaints initiated by the respondent under section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. For dishonouring the cheques issued to discharge the liability, the petitioner company is facing prosecution.


# 2. Brief facts of the case leading to the petition to quash the complaints:-

For purchase of medical equipments, the petitioner company namely, M/s.Vasan Health Care (P) Ltd., borrowed loan from the respondent company, namely, M/s.India Infoline Finance Ltd (IIFL) which is a financial Institution. To discharge the liability, the Managing Director/Authorised Signatory of the petitioner company issued the cheques which are subject matter of the complaints. The cheques, on presentation for collection, returned stating reason “Funds insufficient”. After causing statutory notice, complaints filed against 

  • i) the Company 

  • ii) A.M.Arun, the Managing Director and 

  • iii) Mrs.Meera, the Director. 

Pending trial, yet another creditor of the petitioner company by name M/s.Alcon Laboratories filed application under Section 9 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (in short “IBC”) before the National Company Law Tribunal, Chennai Branch (in short NCLT, Chennai). By an order dated 21/04/2017, the 1st accused company was admitted into the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (in short “CIRP”) and one V.Mahesh was appointed as Interim Resolution Professional (IRP). While so, the second accused A.M.Arun, the representative of the first accused company and the Signatory of the cheques died on 16/11/2020. Later, by an order dated 23/04/2021 NCLT, Chennai appointed Mr.S.Rajendran as Resolution Professional of the 1st accused company.


# 3. According to the petitioner, as per the resolution plan approved by the NCLT, vide order dated 03/02/2023 the Company has been taken over by the successful resolution applicant M/s.ASG Hospital (P) Ltd. The claims of the creditors verified by the RP and settled on condition that all the civil and criminal litigations, investigations, enquires, proceedings causes of action, claims, disputes or other judicial, regulatory proceedings against the corporate debtor or the affairs of the corporate debtor, pending, present or future shall stand extinguished. The respondent Company is one of the creditor whose claim has been admitted by RP and settled as per the resolution plan. Therefore, the prosecution against the petitioner which is the Corporate debtor cannot proceed in view of Section 32A of IBC.


# 4. Relying upon the judgement of the Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Radheshyam Goenka -vs- Tourism Finance Corporation of India Ltd reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 266, the Learned Counsel for the petitioner Company submit that after the order passed by NCLT on 21/04/2017 in the application filed under Section 9 of IBC, the erstwhile Directors of the Company cease to be the Directors and they cannot represent the company after its Management vested with the IPR. Further, the claim of the creditor been settled under the resolution plan approved by the NCLT and therefore, no prosecution can sustain in view of the terms of resolution plan as approved by NCLT vide order dated 03/02/2023.

# 5. The respondent Company though received notice on 12/02/2024 sent through RPAD, had not participated in the proceedings.


# # 6. The point for consideration is whether, the existing criminal liability of the Company and its erstwhile Directors will get extinguished in view of the resolution plan approved by NCLT ?


# 7. The petitioner Company is facing trial in the following nine criminal complaints initiated under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act.

Sl.Nos.

C.C.Nos.

Court

Cheque Date

Amount

1.

312 of 2016

Metropolitan Magistrate, (FTC-II) Egmore, Chennai.

19-09-2015

1000000

2.

310 of 2016

Metropolitan Magistrate, (FTC-II) Egmore, Chennai.

19-09-2015

1000000

3.

311 of 2016

Metropolitan Magistrate, (FTC-II) Egmore, Chennai.

19-09-2015

1000000

4.

309 of 2016

Metropolitan Magistrate, (FTC-II) Egmore, Chennai.

19-09-2015

1000000

5.

313 of 2016

Metropolitan Magistrate, (FTC-II) Egmore, Chennai.

19-09-2015

1000000

6.

3090 of 2016

Metropolitan Magistrate, (FTC-II) Egmore, Chennai.

18-07-2015

500000

20-07-2015

500000

7.

3089 of 2016

Metropolitan Magistrate, (FTC-II) Egmore, Chennai.

08-07-2015

500000

10-07-2015

500000

15-07-2015

500000

8.

308 of 2016

Metropolitan Magistrate, (FTC-II) Egmore, Chennai.

19-09-2015

1000000

9.

3088 of 2016

Metropolitan Magistrate, (FTC-II) Egmore, Chennai.

06-07-2015

500000

13-07-2015

500000


# 8. On application by one of the operational creditor M/s.Alcon Laboratories (P) Ltd under Section 9 of IBC, 2016, for alleged default in payment of Rs.86,65,75,855/-, the NCLT, Chennai Bench vide order dated 21/04/2017 taking note of the default in adhering the payment schedule agreed by the petitioner company, allowed the application and ordered commencement of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process to be ordinarily completed within 180 days and for the said purpose appointed Mr.V.Mahesh as Interim Resolution Professional. Also NCLT declared moratorium for proceedings against the Corporate Debtor with effect from the date of order till the completion of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process.


# 9. The above order of NCLT was stayed by High Court of Madras for a brief period in a Petition filed for winding up. Later, the stay was vacated by the Division Bench on 05/09/2019 with observation that the proceedings under IBC can continue against the Corporate Debtor. Thereafter, the resolution plan submitted by Resolution Professional with consent of Committee of Creditors (CoC) 97.90% voting share and NCLT vide dated 03/02/2023 approved it.


# 10. The petitioner herein had filed a memo before the Judicial Magistrate and sought for dismissal of the complaint against the first accused Company as barred by law in view of Section 32-A of IBC and the judgment of Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Radheyshyam Goenka (cited supra).


# 11. The Judicial Magistrate has returned the memo stating that the relief sought cannot be passed of memo. Meaning, the petitioner should have filed application under relevant provision of law for the relief sought. The petitioner, however had chosen to file petition under section 482 Cr.P.C., to quash the criminal complaint as against the first accused Company which is the Corporate Debtor for the reasons stated above.


# 12. After insertion of Section 32-A in the IBC by way of amendment with effect from 28/12/2019, the liability of the corporate debtor for prior offences is restricted. In Ajay Kumar Radheshuyam Goenka case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after considering the effect of the Section 32-A of IBC in respect of prior liability of the Company and its directors, particularly in proceedings under Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act, had vividly clarified the legal position as under:-

  • “42. Unfortunately, Section 32-A is inelegantly drafted. The second proviso to Section 32-A(1) speaks of persons who are in any manner in charge of, or responsible to the corporate debtor for the conduct of its business or associated with the corporate debtor and who are, directly or indirectly, involved in the commission of “such offence” i.e. the offence referred to in sub-section (1), ‘as per the report submitted or complaint filed by the investigating authority…’. The report submitted here refers to a police report under Section 173CrPC, and complaints filed by investigating authorities under special Acts, as opposed to private complaints. If the language of the second proviso is taken to interpret the language of Section 32-A(1) in that the “offence committed” under Section 32-A(1) would not include offences based upon complaints under Section 2(d)CrPC, the width of the language would be cut down and the object of Section 32-A(1) would not be achieved as all prosecutions emanating 3 from private complaints would be excluded. Obviously, Section 32- A(1) cannot be read in this fashion and clearly includes the liability of the corporate debtor for all offences committed prior to the commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process. Doubtless, a Section 138 proceeding would be included, and would, after the moratorium period comes to an end with a resolution plan by a new management being approved by the adjudicating authority, cease to be an offence qua the corporate debtor.

  • 43. A section which has been introduced by an amendment into an Act with its focus on cesser of liability for offences committed by the corporate debtor prior to the commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process cannot be so construed so as to limit, by a sidewind as it were, the moratorium provision contained in Section 14, with which it is not at all concerned. If the first proviso to Section 32-A(1) is read in the manner suggested by Shri Mehta, it will impact Section 14 by taking out of its ken Sections 138/141 proceedings, which is not the object of Section 32-A(1) at all. Assuming, therefore, that there is a clash between Section 14 IBC and the first proviso of Section 32-A(1), this clash is best resolved by applying the doctrine of harmonious construction so that the objects of both the provisions get subserved in the process, without damaging or limiting one provision at the expense of the other. If, therefore, the expression “prosecution” in the first proviso of Section 32-A(1) refers to criminal proceedings properly so-called either through the medium of a first information report or complaint filed by an investigating authority or complaint and not to quasi-criminal proceedings that are instituted under Sections 138/141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the corporate debtor, the object of Section 14(1) IBC gets subserved, as does the object of Section 32-A, which does away with criminal prosecutions in all cases against the corporate debtor, thus absolving the corporate debtor from the same after a new management comes in.”       (emphasis in original and supplied

  • ……..

  • 68. Thus, I am of the view that by operation of the provisions of IBC, the criminal prosecution initiated against the natural persons under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act read with Section 200CrPC would not stand terminated.

  • ……..

  • 71. It is equally true that once the corporate debtor comes under the resolution process, its erstwhile Managing Director(s) cannot continue to represent the company. Section 305(2)CrPC states that where a corporation is the accused person or one of the accused persons in an inquiry or trial, it may appoint a representative for the purpose of the inquiry or trial and such appointment need not be under the seal of the corporation. Therefore, it is only the resolution professional who can represent the accused Company during the pendency of the proceedings under IBC. After the proceedings are over, either the corporate entity may be dissolved or it can be taken over by a new management in which event the company will continue to exist. When a new management takes over, it will have to make arrangements for representing the company. If the company is dissolved as a result of the resolution process, obviously proceedings against it will have to be terminated. But even then, its erstwhile Directors may not be able to take advantage of the situation. This is because, this Court in Aneeta Hada [Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 350 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 241] , even while overruling its decision in Anil Hada v. Indian Acrylic Ltd. [Anil Hada v. Indian Acrylic Ltd., (2000) 1 SCC 1 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 174], as not laying down the correct law insofar as Anil Hada [Anil Hada v. Indian Acrylic Ltd., (2000) 1 SCC 1 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 174] states that the Director or any other officer can be prosecuted without impleadment of the company, proceeded to hold that the matter would stand on a different footing where there is some legal impediment as the doctrine of lex non cogit ad impossibilia gets attracted. It was specifically observed that the decision in Anil Hada [Anil Hada v. Indian Acrylic Ltd., (2000) 1 SCC 1 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 174] is overruled with the qualifier as stated in para 51. Considering the same, the ratio of the decision of this Court in Ajit Balse [Ajit Balse v. Ranga Karkere, (2015) 15 SCC 748 : (2016) 3 SCC (Civ) 465 : (2016) 3 SCC (Cri) 379] upon which strong reliance is placed on behalf of the appellant is of no avail.

  • 72. What follows from the aforesaid is that for difficulty in prosecuting the corporate debtor under Section 138 of the NI Act after the approval of the resolution plan under IBC, we need not let the natural persons i.e. the signatories to the cheques/Directors of the corporate debtor escape prosecution. How can one allow the natural persons to escape liability on such specious plea? In such a situation the Latin maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia is attracted which means law does not compel a man to do which he cannot possibly perform. Broom’s Legal Maxims contains several illustrative cases in support of the maxim. This maxim has been referred to with approval by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Shamsher Singh [State of Rajasthan v. Shamsher Singh, 1985 Supp SCC 416] .

  • 73. Thus, where the proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act had already commenced and during the pendency the plan is approved or the company gets dissolved, the Directors and the other accused cannot escape from their liability by citing its dissolution. What is dissolved is only the company, not the personal penal liability of the accused covered under Section 141 of the NI Act. They will have to continue to face the prosecution in view of the law laid down in Aneeta Hada [Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 350 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 241] . Where the company continues to remain even at the end of the resolution process, the only consequence is that the erstwhile Directors can no longer represent it.”


# 13. As a result of the above discussion and the law laid in Ajay Kumar Radheshyam Goenka case, it is clear that the corporate debtor cannot be prosecuted for the prior liability after the approval of the Resolution Plan. At the same time, it is to be bear in mind the protection under Section 32-A of Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is restricted only to the Corporate debtor and not to its Directors who were in-charge of the affairs of the Company when the offence committed or the signatory of the cheque.


# 14. Before this Court in this application only the Corporate debtor seeks quash. Therefore, the Criminal Original Petitions are allowed. The criminal prosecution in C.C.Nos.308,309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 3088, 3089 and 3090 of 2016 as against the first accused Company alone stands quashed. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.

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